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Aggravated Sentencing:

Blakely v. Washington
Practical Implications for
State Sentencing Systems
Jon Wool and Don Stemen
At the close of its 2003-2004 term, the United States
Supreme Court roiled many states’ criminal justice systems
when it struck down Washington’s sentencing guidelines
scheme.
In Blakely v. Washington the Court ruled that a judge
may not increase a defendant’s penalty beyond that which
would be available “solely on the basis of the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.”1 Put another
way, under Blakely, when the law establishes an effective
maximum sentence for an offense, the Sixth Amendment’s
right to trial by jury prohibits a judge from imposing a
longer sentence if it is based on a fact—other than prior
conviction—determined by the judge. Any such fact must be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt if not admitted by

This is the inaugural issue of a new series that will focus on the
Supreme Court’s powerful, yet profoundly disrupting, decision in
Blakely v. Washington. Over the next six months, we will seek to
provide timely and helpful analysis of Blakely’s reach, offer practical
advice to state lawmakers needing to realign their systems, and
report on state reactions to the ruling. In sum, we hope to help
decision makers find appropriate answers (many of which already
exist and some of which are working in practice)—and perhaps
even the opportunity for positive change—amid the uncertainty and
apprehension that the Court has caused.
In this first report, we look to answer two big questions: Which
states’ sentencing systems are affected by Blakely? and What
responses are available to legislators and other policymakers? The
first section assesses states according to the characteristics of their
sentencing systems and their susceptibility to Blakely. The second
section examines possible solutions, including the use of jury factfinding for states seeking to retain enhanced penalties and how
voluntary guidelines systems may be inoculated against Blakely ills
by changing the ways in which judges use or report deviations from
their guidelines.
The next publication in the series, the companion piece Legal
Considerations for State Sentencing Systems, will provide a more
detailed examination of the legal issues raised in Blakely and prior
decisions of the Court and discusses the implications for sentencing
provisions apart from those in structured sentencing regimes.

the defendant.
The ruling, which invalidated the provisions of
Washington’s guidelines system that allow a judge to
make factual findings and then impose a penalty beyond
a recommended standard range of sentences, has wide
implications. In her dissent, Justice O’Connor identified nine
other states whose sentencing regimes are cast into doubt
under Blakely. Our analysis suggests that there may be many
more.2
Five states—Kansas, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon,
and Tennessee—employ presumptive sentencing guidelines
systems that enable judges to enhance sentences by finding

Publications are only part of Vera’s Blakely response. We are helping
state officials manage the implications of the ruling, both through
onsite work in capitals and by bringing state leaders together
to learn from national experts and each other about promising
responses. To learn more about Vera’s state work, please contact
me at (212) 376-3073, dwilhelm@vera.org, or visit Vera’s website at
www.vera.org/ssc.
Daniel F. Wilhelm
Director, State Sentencing and Corrections Program

aggravating facts, as does the Washington system addressed
by the Court. At least eight additional non-guidelines states—

Although Justice O’Connor may have understated

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, New Jersey,

the number of states affected by the Court’s ruling,

New Mexico, and Ohio—employ functionally equivalent

the situation may not be as dire as her conclusion

presumptive sentencing systems. The systems in this core

that “[o]ver 20 years of sentencing reform are all

group of 13 states appear to be fundamentally affected by the

but lost.” It is true that affected states will have

Blakely decision.3

to amend their sentencing structures . . . But
that reality is tempered by the fact that in many

Glossary

states, unlike the federal system, judicial fact-

The following definitions reflect their most common usage and
their usage in this report.

finding is used in only a small fraction of cases.

Structured sentencing system: a system providing some form of
recommended sentences within statutory sentence ranges.
Sentencing guidelines system: procedures to guide sentencing
decisions and a system of multiple, recommended sentences
based generally on a calculation of the severity of the offense
committed and the criminal history of the offender.

The fallout may also envelop six other states—Arkansas,
Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island,4 Utah, and Virginia—
employing voluntary sentencing guidelines systems that
nonetheless require a court to apply a suggested sentence
range and provide justification for any sentence above that

Presumptive sentencing guidelines: sentencing guidelines that
require a judge to impose the recommended (presumptive)
sentence or one within a recommended range, or provide
justification for imposing a different sentence.

recommended by the range. Depending on how future
court decisions define the scope of Blakely, it is also possible
that two indeterminate sentencing states—Michigan
and Pennsylvania—that employ presumptive sentencing

Voluntary sentencing guidelines: sentencing guidelines that do
not require a judge to impose a recommended sentence, but
may require the judge to provide justification for imposing a
different sentence.

guidelines systems may run afoul of the ruling. Finally,
Blakely has implications for other state sentencing provisions
beyond these 21 with structured sentencing systems.5 Every
statute that provides for an enhanced penalty beyond that

Presumptive sentencing: a system of recommended
(presumptive) sentences, based solely on the offense or offense
class, that a judge must impose or provide justification for
imposing a different sentence.

authorized solely by the jury’s verdict must be examined to

Effective maximum sentence: the maximum sentence
authorized for an offense based solely on the facts reflected in
the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.

finding that the defendant was on parole at the time of the

determine whether it is based on facts—other than prior
conviction—determined by a judge. Such statutes include
those that allow additional punishment upon a judge’s
offense, that the crime was committed for compensation,
or that the victim was of a certain age. We will discuss these
implications in a companion report, Legal Considerations for

Enhanced sentence: a sentence longer than the effective
maximum sentence.

State Sentencing Systems.
Although Justice O’Connor may have understated
the number of states affected by the Court’s ruling, the

Determinate sentencing system: a system in which there is
no discretionary releasing authority and an offender may be
released from prison only after expiration of the sentence
imposed (less available good or earned time).

situation may not be as dire as her conclusion that “[o]ver
20 years of sentencing reform are all but lost.”6 It is true
that affected states will have to amend their sentencing
structures in large or small ways. But that reality is tempered

Indeterminate sentencing system: a system in which a
discretionary releasing authority, such as a parole board, may
release an offender from prison prior to expiration of the
sentence imposed. It may also, but need not, allow judges to
impose a sentence range (such as, three-to-six years) rather
than a specific period of time to be served.

by the fact that in many states, unlike the federal system,
judicial fact-finding is used in only a small fraction of cases
and thus is easier to avoid while states are constructing
responses. Moreover, there are ways to cure Blakely ills,
and examples exist of constitutionally-sound solutions
that largely preserve the goals that drove states to enact
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structured sentencing systems. As Justice Scalia states for

Presumptive sentencing guidelines systems:
fundamentally affected by Blakely
Minnesota
North Carolina
Oregon
Tennessee
Washington

the Court, “we are not . . . find[ing] determinate sentencing
schemes unconstitutional. . . . Nothing we have said impugns
[the] salutary objectives” of “proportionality to the gravity of
the offense and parity among defendants” that prompted
Washington’s guidelines system.7
That having been said, states’ ability to limit judicial
discretion to achieve these and other goals is now
significantly constrained. It is perhaps ironic that the Court

Presumptive (non-guidelines) sentencing systems:
fundamentally affected by Blakely
Alaska
Arizona
California
Colorado
Indiana
New Jersey
New Mexico
Ohio

has found that the Sixth Amendment, with its jury guarantee
as a bulwark against state power, actually limits attempts to
reign in judicial authority through structured sentencing. On
the one hand, it is hard to argue with the Court’s view of the
centrality of both the right to be tried by a jury of one’s peers
and the application of the highest standard of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt; indeed the dissenting justices do not
make much of an effort. On the other hand, it is the Court’s
insistence on drawing a “bright-line” formulation to protect
these rights, one that establishes a firm constitutional line
rather than allowing legislative and judicial flexibility, that is
precipitating the present upheaval.8

Voluntary sentencing systems:
possibly affected by Blakely
Arkansas
Delaware
Maryland
Rhode Island
Utah
Virginia

The Impact of Blakely on State Systems
At the end of the day, Blakely’s reach largely will be
determined by courts in the states. They will determine the
force and effect of their sentencing rules and whether certain
provisions violate Blakely. And they will determine whether
simply the offending provisions are affected or whether a
state’s entire structured sentencing scheme is void. It is likely

Voluntary sentencing systems: not affected by Blakely
District of Columbia
Louisiana
Missouri
Wisconsin

that results will differ state to state based on distinctions in
sentencing structures, differing interpretations of the Court’s
ruling, and the degree to which pragmatic concerns about
systemic impact influence judgment. It will take a few years
for the ultimate nature and scope of Blakely’s impact to be
known, but this much we know for certain: its potential to

Presumptive sentencing guidelines in indeterminate
systems: possibly affected by Blakely
Michigan
Pennsylvania

reshape sentencing in the United States is profound, as we
discuss below.

Presumptive sentencing guidelines systems
It is evident that the four other states (not including Kansas,
which is discussed below) with presumptive sentencing
guidelines systems—Minnesota, North Carolina, Oregon,
and Tennessee—will be affected by the decision to the same

Washington, for its part, prescribes a presumed sentence

extent as Washington. In each of these states, guidelines
establish a range for an offense that sets the maximum

range, the “standard range,” within the broader statutory

sentence a judge may impose based on the jury’s verdict.

sentence range for each offense. The judge must impose a

A judge may impose a sentence above the maximum in

definite term within this standard range, but on finding an

the range only when the judge makes a finding of aggravating

“aggravating factor” the judge may impose an “exceptional

factors.

sentence” beyond the standard range but lower than the
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
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statutory maximum. When an exceptional sentence is based

of facts by the judge—the very thing the Supreme Court ruled

on such an aggravating factor, the judge must articulate, for

violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury.

9

the record, facts to support that decision. The guidelines

Kansas employs a presumptive sentencing guidelines

systems in Minnesota and Oregon are nearly identical in

system similar to Washington’s. However, Kansas’s system

structure to Washington. Those in North Carolina and

is not generally implicated by Blakely because it has amended

Tennessee are different, but not in ways relevant to the ruling

its statutes to require that a jury find any fact that forms

in Blakely.

the basis of an enhanced sentence. Kansas acted in response

Unlike other systems, North Carolina’s guidelines are

to the only state court decision that struck down its

“mandatory” in that they require a judge in every case to

guidelines system for the reasons ultimately determined by

impose a sentence within the designated cell of a sentencing

the Court in Blakely.12 As we discuss below, the Kansas model

10

guidelines grid. Thus, judges in North Carolina cannot

represents one solution to the problem in these

impose a sentence above those recommended within a

states’ systems.13

guidelines cell, as judges can in Washington. However, the
aggravated ranges within each cell. The court must impose a

Presumptive (non-guidelines)
sentencing systems

sentence within the presumptive range unless the judge

At least eight states that do not formally employ guidelines—

finds aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence.

Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Indiana, New Jersey,

Only then may the judge impose a sentence within the

New Mexico, and Ohio—nonetheless employ presumptive

aggravated range. In this sense, a sentence in the aggravated

sentences and require judges to provide justification

range in North Carolina is an enhanced sentence, equivalent

when they deviate from those sentences. Although these

to an “exceptional sentence” under the Washington guidelines.

states’ systems lack the multiple ranges of sentencing

North Carolina guidelines set mitigated, presumptive, and

guidelines systems, they are comprehensively structured
and functionally equivalent to guidelines, at least for Sixth

Blakely’s reach largely will be determined

Amendment purposes. In all of these—often referred to

by courts in the states. They will

as presumptive sentencing or determinate sentencing
systems—statutes set a single presumptive sentence or range

determine whether certain provisions of

of sentences for each offense within the statutory range. The

a state’s sentencing rules violate Blakely.

judge must impose that presumptive sentence or one within
the presumptive range and may impose a higher term only
after finding aggravating factors.

In Tennessee, on the other hand, guidelines establish

New Mexico is typical. In New Mexico, statutes set a

sentence ranges with single-term “presumptive sentences”

single-term “basic sentence of imprisonment” for each

within those ranges. For the most serious class of felonies,

offense. For a first degree felony, for example, the basic

the presumptive sentence is the midpoint in the guidelines

sentence is 18 years; for a second degree felony, it is nine

range; for lesser felonies, the presumptive sentence is the

years. The appropriate basic sentence must be imposed

minimum term in the guidelines range. The court must

unless the court alters it based on aggravating or mitigating

impose the presumptive sentence unless the judge states

circumstances. When the judge finds any “aggravating

on the record a finding of an “enhancement factor.” In

circumstance” relevant to the offense or the defendant, the

such instances the judge may impose a sentence up to the

judge may impose a sentence up to one-third above the

maximum in the guidelines range for the offense.11 Thus,

basic sentence.14 Thus, in New Mexico, the basic sentence,

Tennessee’s guidelines differ from those in Washington in

although a single term, acts as the effective maximum

that the presumptive sentence is a single term of years rather

sentence a defendant may receive absent a judicial finding of

than a range of sentences. This single term is the effective

an aggravating circumstance.

maximum for an offense because a sentence above this term

Alaska, Arizona, California, Indiana, New Jersey, and

(even within the guidelines range) requires a finding of

Ohio use different terminology for the “basic sentences”

additional “enhancement factors.”

and “aggravating circumstances” they rely on, but to the

All of these states share the same fundamental problem:

same effect. In Ohio, for example, statutes require the court

a jury’s verdict, or a defendant’s guilty plea, only authorizes a

to impose the “shortest prison term authorized for the

sentence to the presumptive maximum sentence or within the

offense” unless the judge finds that the shortest prison term

presumptive range. An enhanced sentence requires a finding

will “demean the seriousness” of the offender’s conduct

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
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or “not adequately protect the public;” in such cases the

the judge to impose a sentence that varies more than five

judge may impose any term up to the statutory maximum.15

percent from the presumptive sentence, written justification

In California, statutes prescribe a “lower,” “middle,” and

“specifying the reasons for such departure” must be given.18

“upper” term for each offense and require a judge to

Similarly, in Virginia the judge must “review and consider”

impose the middle term absent a finding of “aggravating

the suitability of the applicable “discretionary” sentencing

16

circumstances.” In Colorado, on the other hand, statutes

guidelines. Before imposing sentence, the judge “shall state

set a fairly wide “presumptive range” for each offense class

for the record” that such review and consideration have been

and require the court to impose a definite sentence within

accomplished. If the judge imposes a sentence greater than

the presumptive range unless it concludes that “extraordinary

that indicated by the guidelines, the judge must file a “written

aggravating circumstances” are present and support a

explanation of such departure.”19

different sentence that “better serves the purposes” of the

The requirement in each jurisdiction that a judge first

criminal code. If the judge finds such circumstances, the

apply the sentences articulated in the guidelines and then

judge may impose a sentence up to twice the maximum

provide reasons for a decision not to follow them may

authorized in the presumptive range for the offense.17

bring them within the Blakely rule. Put another way, the

As with the presumptive guidelines jurisdictions, these

requirement that a judge state reasons as a pre-condition of

states share the common problem that a jury verdict, or guilty

an enhanced sentence may establish the top of the guidelines

plea, only authorizes a sentence to the presumptive term or

range as the effective maximum sentence—a situation no

within the presumptive range. Any enhanced sentence relies

different from the one presented in Blakely. Whether this is

on judicial fact-finding in violation of the Blakely rule.

so will have to be determined first by the courts through their
interpretations of the practical effect of the state’s specific

Voluntary sentencing systems

statutory or administrative language. If a court holds that

In contrast with states that use presumptive sentencing

the practical effect of a state’s system is that a judge cannot

systems, with or without guidelines, 10 jurisdictions employ

deliver an enhanced sentence absent the finding and stating

voluntary guidelines systems. These systems are similar in

of reasons beyond those found by a jury or admitted by a

structure to the Washington guidelines in that they prescribe

defendant, these systems may fall.20

a range of sentences for each offense or offense class, but

Such a result is far from certain for the following reasons.

they differ in that the ranges are expressly not binding.

One could argue that the advisory character of the systems

Because there is considerable variety in the structure of these

in these five states would spare them Blakely problems;

systems and differences in how legislatures instruct judges to

judges are expressly not required to follow the guidelines

employ the guidelines, some states may be at greater risk to

recommendations. A court could hold, therefore, that the

Blakely challenge than others. These 10 jurisdictions fall into

requirement that judges apply the guidelines and provide

two basic groups.

reasons for departing does not in fact constrain a judge’s

In four of these systems—those of the District of

discretion but serves solely as an information-recording

Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri, and Wisconsin—judges are

function. Or it could determine that the requirement that

encouraged to consider guidelines ranges in determining

reasons be provided is so flexible—allowing a statement to

appropriate sentences, but no additional fact-finding is

the effect of “the guidelines range is not adequate for this

required of a judge to impose a sentence outside the range

offense”—that the jury verdict or plea alone authorizes a

and up to the statutory maximum. Nor is there a requirement

sentence up to the statutory maximum. In such instances,

that judges provide reasons for doing so. In these four

these states may indeed be immune to Blakely. That said,

jurisdictions, the effective maximum sentence—that which is

there is adequate reason for caution.21 The Court made clear

authorized by the jury verdict or a defendant’s guilty plea—is

that the practical effects of sentencing rules determine the

the statutory maximum in all cases; thus they do not seem to

scope of the right to trial by jury, whether a system is called

conflict with Blakely.

voluntary or not.22

The other six voluntary guidelines states—Arkansas,
however, run afoul of Blakely. They require judges first to

Presumptive sentencing guidelines
in indeterminate systems

apply the guidelines ranges but then allow them to depart

Two states—Michigan and Pennsylvania—are in a somewhat

upward—provided they state their reasons for doing so. In

different situation and it is less clear whether Blakely will

Arkansas, for example, “the presumptive sentence” in all

affect them. Indeed, it is possible to construct equally

cases is determined according to sentencing guidelines; for

compelling arguments that Blakely does or does not apply.

Delaware, Maryland, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia—may,

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
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The arguments turn on competing definitions of the effective

Part of the difficulty in assessing the effect of Blakely is

maximum sentence in such indeterminate states.

that it addressed a determinate sentencing structure—one

Michigan and Pennsylvania employ indeterminate

without parole or other discretionary release—in which the

sentencing schemes with presumptive guidelines.23 In

sentence is expressed as a single term that fully determines

both states, judges set a minimum and maximum term to

when a defendant will be released. No decision in the

each sentence, but limits are imposed only on the setting

Apprendi25 line has explicitly addressed the effect of these

of the minimum term. The maximum term may be set in

rulings on indeterminate sentencing structures such as in

all instances up to the statutory maximum. The minimum

Michigan and Pennsylvania.26 Future rulings will be required

term determines a defendant’s parole eligibility date, or the

to settle how, or if, Blakely applies to these states.27

period a defendant must serve in prison; the maximum
term controls a defendant’s mandatory release date, or the

There is, finally, one other group of states that this

maximum period a defendant will serve if not released by a

decision affects. A number of jurisdictions (some of which

parole board. Thus, in each state, the judge determines how

have already been discussed as implicated by Blakely) are

long an offender must serve in prison before being eligible

currently revising their sentencing systems or criminal

for parole release. The sentencing guidelines in these states

codes, or studying the need to do so. They include Alabama,

establish a range of minimum terms. A judge may impose a

Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, New Jersey, New

minimum term above the guidelines range only by finding

Mexico, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Blakely’s ultimate effects

aggravating factors on the record.

should significantly influence the manner in which they

The Court has previously held that the Sixth Amendment is

pursue reforms.

not violated by a system that requires an enhanced minimum
sentence based upon judicial findings of fact. Yet that ruling

Reconciling State Sentencing
Systems with Blakely

applies only so long as the enhanced minimum sentence is
not beyond that “authorized by the jury’s verdict.”24
On the one hand, therefore, it may be argued that a

The dissenting opinions in the Blakely case were short on

sentence with an enhanced minimum term in Michigan and

constitutional argument and long on discussion of the dire

Pennsylvania effectively exceeds that authorized by the jury

practical considerations for state sentencing systems. This

verdict because a defendant who receives such a sentence

is not surprising; the constitutional issue had been largely

likely will remain incarcerated longer than one who receives a

decided in the Court’s prior rulings, and the implications

sentence with a minimum term within the guidelines range.

for many states, as well as the federal system, are indeed

To the extent that an enhanced minimum term—that is, one

enormous. But will they be as dire as predicted?

beyond the guidelines range—leads to a longer period of

Before venturing an answer, it is important to note that,

incarceration by extending the date at which the defendant

constitutional jurisprudence aside, the Blakely decision

is eligible to be released, these systems may be held to

allows for some seemingly perverse effects. For example, in

violate Blakely.

a sentencing system that fully relies on statutory minimum

On the other hand, it is also possible to characterize the

and maximum sentences, judges have the fact-finding

maximum sentence authorized by the jury verdict as being

authority necessary to determine the appropriate sentence

controlled solely by the maximum term in an indeterminate

anywhere within the statutory range up to the maximum in

system, and there is no limit on the maximum term a judge

any given case.28 In such a system a judge may be authorized

may set in these two states up to the statutory maximum.

to make a fact-finding of deliberate cruelty, for example, and

Moreover, because of the discretion vested in the parole

sentence a defendant to three years more incarceration than

board—the hallmark of indeterminate sentencing—some

the judge might have otherwise. Yet a state is no longer free

who are given non-enhanced minimum terms may remain

to do precisely that if it imposes limits on judicial sentencing

incarcerated longer than those sentenced to enhanced

discretion, as Washington did by enacting guidelines

minimum terms; the minimum term only commences

that regulate maximum sentences short of the statutory

parole eligibility but does not require that a defendant be

maximum. Thus the states may achieve in one context what

released on that date. Thus, to the extent it is determined that

the Court says the Constitution prohibits in another. It is

the effective maximum sentence is the statutory maximum

perhaps perverse that the scope of the right to trial by jury

or that the mere likelihood of an increased period of

turns on such a distinction.

incarceration is not sufficient to trigger the jury right, these

Such effects notwithstanding, the Court’s ruling does

systems will be upheld.

not require states to abandon their guidelines systems—
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
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Managing a Response to Blakely

although it certainly limits a state’s avenues to channel
judicial discretion. States that have chosen to rein in judicial
discretion through the presumptive or voluntary systems

Kansas shows that states can create effective and well-

affected by Blakely still have an option that retains the core

informed processes to respond to Blakely. Following

of their systems and complies with the ruling. Those states

the Supreme Court’s 2000 Apprendi ruling, Kansas

can allocate fact-finding to juries when enhanced sentences

officials were concerned about the constitutionality of

are sought. States that seek to maintain a maximum of
judicial sentencing authority while providing persuasive,

their presumptive guidelines system. Even before the

although non-binding, guidance may seek to make their

state’s high court later validated that concern, the Kansas

voluntary systems fully voluntary—like those in the District

Sentencing Commission created a subcommittee to

of Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri, and Wisconsin—if the

study the applicability of the ruling and to consider policy

courts hold that they currently are not so. And the imperative

responses. Importantly, the subcommittee included

of revisiting current systems also may provide an opportunity
for some states to move from a presumptive system to a

legislators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges.

voluntary one, or vice versa. The decision each state makes

The participation of all four of these groups was essential

likely will turn on the goals it sought to achieve by enacting

to the creation of a legislative response that was not only

guidelines, the degree to which those goals remain vital,

substantively workable and fair but politically acceptable.

and the combustible political forces that exert themselves
whenever criminal justice is the subject of reform.

As the group came to understand the Court’s decision

The feasibility of jury fact-finding

and to consider which legislative options were most

After the Kansas Supreme Court invalidated the state’s

appropriate, subcommittee members kept the following

guidelines system in 2001 (presaging Blakely), the legislature

key questions in mind, according to Barbara Tombs, then

chose to retain presumptive guidelines by incorporating

executive director of the Commission:

jury fact-finding as the basis of an enhanced sentence.29

•

Kansas’s choice and its subsequent experience thus provide

First, what are the underlying goals of sentencing

some guidance for states that must alter their systems.

guidelines? Are principles of fairness, public safety,
•

Under the revised system, if Kansas prosecutors decide

and resource control served by a possible solution?

to seek an enhanced sentence, they must file a motion 30

Second, how are the burdens of a possible solution

days before trial. The judge then decides whether, in the

distributed? Does either the defense or prosecution

interests of justice, the evidence of enhancing factors must
be presented at a post-trial sentencing hearing rather than

enjoy an unfair advantage or suffer an undue burden

at the trial.30 Only evidence that has been disclosed to the

as a result? Are these factors in balance?
•

defense is admissible in an enhancement determination; if

Third, how does a solution affect judicial discretion

the defendant testifies at such a hearing it is not admissible

and resources? Does a solution fit within understood

in any subsequent criminal proceeding. The jury must be

or articulated powers granted to the court? And is

unanimous that a factor has been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. If the jury finds such a factor, the judge nonetheless

it a solution that a court can apply with its existing

retains the discretion to sentence within or beyond the

capacity?

guidelines range.
Neither prosecutors nor the defense bar have raised strong

Thoughtful deliberations guided by these questions and

concerns about the justice or efficiency of this procedure. The

participation by necessary institutional actors from both

Kansas Appellate Defender Office amicus brief in Blakely,
arguing against the constitutionality of presumptive systems

sides of the adversarial system and all three branches of

such as Washington’s and Kansas’s former system, provides

government led to the creation of a legislative response

implicit support for the state’s legislative response. Interviews

that was quickly embraced and has proven to be effective

with defenders in the state indicate that the defense bar

in practice.

generally finds the procedure unobjectionable with one
exception: the possibility that prejudicial “sentencing factors”
might be presented during the trial (which appears not to
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
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have occurred to date). Interviews with prosecutors and

lead to “significant administrative difficulties,” as the federal

judges in the state also indicate that the procedure does not

government’s Blakely brief puts it.36 First, in systems that use

place significant extra burdens on the system. It has been

a large number of judicially-determined factors in arriving at

used infrequently, but not because it is unworkable. Indeed,

the initial presumptive range—such as the federal system—

it had always been rare for judges to sentence defendants to

jury fact-finding would have to be employed in virtually every

enhanced sentences after trial, largely because in a plea-

sentencing, not just those in which an enhanced sentence

driven system the available sentences after trial are already

was sought. It appears, however, that no state system relies

31

effectively “enhanced.”

on factors that determine the presumptive range to a degree
comparable to the federal system.37 Second, in states that

It is perhaps not surprising that jury fact-finding has
proved feasible in Kansas. It is common in parts of other

require prosecution by grand jury indictment there may be

states’ systems. Although not a structured sentencing state,

the significant additional burden of presenting “sentencing

Illinois previously authorized extended sentences based on

factors” for grand jury consideration at the outset of virtually

judicially-determined facts. Following the Supreme Court’s

every felony case to enable their later presentation to the

ruling in Apprendi, Illinois changed its enhancement statute

trial jury.38

to require that an aggravating factor be included in the
charging document and that it be proved to the jury beyond

Fully voluntary guidelines

a reasonable doubt.32 Although California employs a general

Some states, particularly those with voluntary systems that

presumptive system in which judges make fact findings

are deemed to be affected by Blakely, may choose not to

necessary to depart from presumptive sentences, implicating

follow Kansas’s example of requiring juries to make such fact

Blakely, in other circumstances it requires that aggravating

findings. Rather they may choose to eliminate their effective

factors—such as possession of a weapon in the course of an

sentencing thresholds and adopt fully voluntary sentencing

33

enumerated offense—be put to a jury.

systems. Here, too, there are examples from which states may

It also has to be kept in mind that concerns voiced by

draw lessons. The District of Columbia, Louisiana, Missouri,

a number of commentators regarding the workability of

and Wisconsin have enacted such fully voluntary systems.
Presumably they did so to achieve a proper balance between
judicial discretion and legislative or administrative control

The hope is that Blakely provides as much an

so that sentences are geographically and racially neutral and

opportunity as it does a challenge and that

appropriate to the offense.
To make their systems fully voluntary, these states might

legislators will develop different and better

eliminate the requirement that judges provide reasons as

approaches ...

a prerequisite to an enhanced sentence. Such a change is
not, of course, without consequences and again suggests
an apparently perverse result of the Blakely ruling. The

jury fact-finding have a limited reach. The vast majority of

requirement that judges provide reasons for departures

criminal cases, perhaps as high as 95 percent, do not result

would seem to be based on a state’s determination of the

in trials,34 and it appears that most guidelines states use

value of publicly stating those reasons. Few would disagree

enhanced sentences in only between two percent and nine

that there is inherent value in requiring government actors

percent of all cases.35 As with Kansas, Blakely affects only a

to explain publicly decisions that have important individual

small subset of trial cases that result in enhanced sentences,

and societal effects. And a state seeking to understand the

and trial cases themselves are only a small subset of all felony

causes of racial or geographic disparities in sentencing, for

cases. Of course, the Blakely ruling may very well have some

example, might examine the reasons stated in cases where

tangential effect on cases that result in pleas. The bargaining

members of different groups are given enhanced sentences.

powers of prosecution and defense may shift, although it is

Moreover, although there is generally no right to appeal

far from clear in what direction, and the reports from Kansas

a sentence simply because it falls beyond the voluntary

are inconclusive in this regard. To the extent that the number

guidelines, appellate courts might in the future perform a

of trials in the criminal justice system has diminished, the

rudimentary reasonableness review of all sentences, and this

consequences of requiring juries to determine sentencing

review would rely on sentencing judges’ statements of their

factors for enhanced sentences are relatively modest.

reasons. A regime that discourages the stating of reasons may

On the other hand, there are two ways—not present in

adversely affect such appellate review of the reasonableness of

Kansas—in which jury fact-finding of aggravating factors may
VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
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but because application of the guidelines is truly voluntary

Questions to consider.

the effective maximum sentence in each case is the statutory
maximum and no Blakely problem arises. The nation’s most
recently implemented sentencing guidelines system—in

In deciding how to fashion a cure to a state’s Blakely ills,

the District of Columbia—has taken this approach.

there are a number of questions each state may wish to

The District expressly allows for sentencing outside the

consider to ensure that the cure is not worse than the

guidelines box based upon a “decision by a judge not to use

disease. A state may consider the following in light of

the sentencing guidelines.”39 It was a conscious decision

the goals that underlie its decision to enact structured

of the District’s sentencing commission to provide judges
with the information that advisory guidelines offer but to

sentencing:
•

allow judges to continue to sentence according to their own
processes. The system also preserves the benefits of judicially

How will a chosen system affect the balance of power

stated sentencing reasons—it requires stated reasons in all

between the defense and the prosecution, especially in

cases, whether judges apply the guidelines or not—and the

regard to its effects on the system of plea bargaining?

commission hopes to use information both from judges who
use the guidelines and those who do not in fashioning future

•

How will it affect the ability of judges to incorporate

changes to the system.

sentencing factors relevant to the specific

Other possible options

circumstances of the offense and specific history and

Justice Breyer, in his Blakely dissent, mentions other

circumstances of the defendant?
•

possible options for states. One is an outright bar on judicial
discretion through what he calls “determinate sentencing”:

How will it affect racial and other demographic

mandatory terms or ranges of terms from which a judge may

disparities in sentencing?
•

not depart. There is one state example of this approach in
the non-guidelines context. Iowa uses a mandatory system

How will it affect geographic disparities; will like cases

in which judges are bound to impose the sole statutory term

be treated more alike or less alike in different parts of

of years for most felony offenses and the parole board has

the state?

discretion to determine how long the defendant ultimately
will serve. But, in the guidelines context, it appears that no

•

state uses a system that is fully mandatory. Other than Iowa,

How will it affect average sentence lengths and, thus,

the states shy away from such extreme limits on judicial

prison populations?
•

sentencing discretion.
Another of Justice Breyer’s options is a retreat from

What effects will it have on the predictability of

guidelines altogether, to the indeterminate sentencing

sentences for purposes of determining institutional

regimes used in roughly half the states. But given the caution

resources, such as probation and corrections staff

and discernable lack of appetite to abolish guidelines systems

and facilities?

that many state officials have shown in the weeks since
Blakely, there is little reason to suspect that states will jettison
their guidelines altogether rather than apply one of the
modifications mentioned above.
Justice Breyer suggests, too, that there may be more

Voluntary states affected by Blakely have another option,

threatening responses to Blakely, such as a top-down system

however, for achieving fully voluntary systems. They can

in which the presumptive sentence for each offense would be

retain the general requirement that judges provide reasons

the maximum sentence authorized by statute. A sentencing

for their sentencing decisions but make explicit that judges

judge might then depart downward only after finding

need only consider, but need not apply, the guidelines in

mitigating facts. Yet, there is no reason to believe this option

any given case. Although this distinction may seem to split

will prove attractive to state policymakers as it would be costly

hairs, the Supreme Court’s bright-line rule requires that

and might lead to harsh, perhaps unpredictable, sentences.

hairs be split somewhere, and this seems a likely place. In

More realistic may be an option that Florida has chosen, in

this way the value of judicially stated reasons is preserved,

which a judge’s ability to sentence at the top of the statutory

VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE
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7

range is not constrained. Yet, those states that enacted

Blakely, slip op. at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court
uses the term “determinate sentencing” in the same way we use
“structured sentencing.”

guidelines to control sentences deemed excessive may not
be satisfied with such an approach. For such states the cost
of jury fact-finding, as in Kansas, may be in line with the

8

Id. at 18.

benefits of maintaining presumptive sentence ranges.

9

Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.535, 539.

10

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A–1340.13.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely is not surprising

11

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210.

from a legal standpoint in that it did not stray far from

12

State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001).

prior decisions. But it is truly extraordinary when viewed

13

••••••

The Kansas Supreme Court, however, subsequently limited its holding to upward durational departures, finding upward dispositional departures not to be implicated by Blakely’s antecedents. For the reasons
that will be stated in the companion report, Legal Considerations for
State Sentencing Systems, it is doubtful that this distinction will stand;
Kansas too therefore may be affected by Blakely.

in the context of its near and far term implications for state
sentencing systems. We have attempted one view of those
likely implications, but this story is only beginning to play
out. How courts will interpret different systems in light of
Blakely is largely unknown and will guide legislatures in
crafting new systems that preserve a reinvigorated right

14

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15(B), 15.1.

to trial by jury while also preserving to the greatest extent

15

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.14(C).

possible the goals of their structured sentencing systems.

16

Cal. Penal Code § 1170.

17

Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1.3-401.

18

Ark. Code. Ann. §16-90-803, 804.

The hope is that Blakely provides as much an opportunity as
it does a challenge and that legislators will develop different
and better approaches than those we have mentioned.
To place in context the burdens state legislatures now

19

of his equals and neighbours, rather than a lone

Va. Code Ann. §19.2-298.01(A), (B). Arkansas and Virginia both rely
on jury sentencing for all cases tried before a jury. In such cases, the
jury is free to select any sentence within the statutory sentence range
and is not in any way required to base the sentence on the sentencing guidelines. In such jury-sentencings, no Blakely issue is raised.
However, the judge determines the sentence in any case where: the
defendant pleads guilty to an offense; the defendant waives a jury trial
and is tried by the court; the jury does not unanimously agree on the
sentence; or the prosecution and the defense agree that the court may
fix punishment. In such cases, the court must apply the sentencing
guidelines and provide justification for an enhanced sentence.

employee of the State.40

20

face, Justice Scalia’s closing words regarding Mr. Blakely’s
enhanced sentence serve as a useful reminder of what is
at stake:
The Framers would not have thought it too much
to demand that, before depriving a man of three
more years of his liberty, the State should suffer
the modest inconvenience of submitting its
accusation to the unanimous suffrage of twelve

Louisiana provides an example of a state whose guidelines were labeled as voluntary but found by the courts to be presumptive because
judges were required to apply them and provide reasons for departing
from the recommended range.

Notes

21

See the companion report, Legal Considerations, for a fuller discussion of the Court’s reasoning and its implications.

1

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ____; No. 02-1632 (June 24, 2004)
slip op. at 7 (emphasis in original).

22

In this paper we use “structured sentencing systems” to refer to sentencing guidelines, whether labeled presumptive or voluntary, as well
as to other comprehensive systems of presumptive sentences.

There is yet one further distinction that might insulate three of
the voluntary guidelines systems from Blakely in the event that they
are deemed to be within its ambit. Arkansas, Delaware, and Virginia
statutorily require judges to provide reasons for a sentence beyond the
guidelines range. In Maryland, Rhode Island, and Utah, on the other
hand, sentencing commission policy or court rule, rather than statute,
provides the source of the legal rule that requires reasons to be stated
for a sentence above the guidelines recommendation. Md. Regs Code,
14 § 22.01.05; Utah Code Jud. Admin., App. D: R.I. Rules of Court,
Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks. However, as will be discussed
in Legal Considerations, to the extent that such administrative rules
have the force of law it is likely that this distinction ultimately will be
found immaterial under the Court’s reasoning.

6
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2

This examination focuses solely on the effects of Blakely on state
sentencing structures. It does not address the ruling’s significant
impact on the federal sentencing structure.
3

As discussed below, Kansas’s system is not generally implicated by
Blakely.
4

Rhode Island does not have a guidelines system per se. Rather, it
employs “sentencing benchmarks” similar to the other five states
mentioned here, established by court rule.
5

Blakely, slip op. at 13 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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Additionally, Florida, which has determinate sentences expressed
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as a single term, employs a system that provides a presumptive
minimum sentence for each offense/criminal history score. It is thus
rather like one-half of a presumptive guidelines system. The sentencing court may sentence the defendant to any sentence at or above the
designated minimum up to the statutory maximum. Because there is
no constraint on a judge’s sentencing decision above the presumptive minimum, the sentence authorized by the jury verdict or plea is
always the statutory maximum, to which a judge may sentence any
defendant. The only constraint is on sentences below the mimumum,
for which the judge must provide reasons. Such a system is in no way
implicated by Blakely.

There is a constitutional limit on what the state can choose to label
a sentencing factor and thus allocate to judicial fact-finding, and what
to label an element and leave to juries to determine, but states have
wide discretion in this area and there is no bright-line rule to help in
drawing the line. See Blakely, slip op. at 6, n. 6.
29

Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-4718(b).

30

Justices Breyer and O’Connor note in their Blakely dissents the
problem of character and other evidence not strictly relevant to the
charge prejudicing a jury in its determination of guilt, thus necessitating a separate post-trial sentencing hearing in some instances. Slip
op. at 8 (Breyer, J., dissenting) and 6 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

24

Harris v. United States 536 U.S. 545 (2002) at 567. For further discussion of Harris, see Legal Considerations.

31

Indeed, in the four years before the new procedure took effect,
there were never more than 24 jury trial cases in the state that led
to enhanced sentences. Figures compiled by the Kansas Sentencing
Commission, provided by e-mail correspondence.

25

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), was the first definitive
statement governing the Sixth Amendment’s jury right as it applies to
the finding of facts relevant to enhanced sentences.
26

In a footnote, the Michigan Supreme Court has noted that Blakely
“did not affect indeterminate sentencing systems,” such as Michigan’s. People v. Claypool, No. 122696 (Mich., July 22, 2004), slip op. at
17, n.14. In response, the Chief Justice stated: “Given the lack of any
definitive statement by the United States Supreme Court regarding
mandatory minimum sentences, I believe that sweeping statements of
broad judicial authority . . . may serve only to borrow trouble.” Slip op.
at 11 (Corrigan, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

32

725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/111-3(c-5).

33

See, for example, Cal. Penal Code §12022.53.

34

In 2000, 95 percent of all felony convictions in state courts followed
a guilty plea, three percent followed a jury trial, and two percent a
bench trial. Matthew R. Durose and Patrick A. Langan, State Court
Sentencing of Convicted Felons, 2000 Statistical Tables. (Washington,
DC: Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, June 2003)
Tables 4.1 and 4.2.

27

One other state, New Jersey, has a provision adjunct to its basic
presumptive sentencing structure whereby judges may, upon the judicial finding of aggravating factors, set a minimum term that increases
the likelihood that a defendant will remain incarcerated longer than
otherwise. New Jersey uses an indeterminate system in which judges
set a maximum term for each sentence; the minimum term for each
sentence is one-third of the maximum imposed by the court. Yet, upon
the finding that “aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating factors” a judge may set a minimum term that is one-half of the
maximum term imposed. N.J. Stat. Ann. §2C:43-6(b). This minimum
term extends the defendant’s parole eligibility date from the typical
one-third to what is effectively one-half of the maximum term. Just as
in Michigan and Pennsylvania, therefore, defendants sentenced to enhanced minimum terms may remain incarcerated for longer than they
would have in the absence of the judicial finding of aggravating factors.

35

Brian J. Ostrom, Neal B. Krauder, David Rottman, and Meredith
Peterson (1998), Sentencing Digest: Examining Current Sentencing
Issues and Policies (Williamsburg, VA: National Center for State Courts)
at 13.
36

Brief for the United States at 31.

37

This problem will be discussed in Legal Considerations.

38

Eleven states and the District of Columbia require grand jury indictments of felony charges, five of which are among those we conclude
are possibly affected by Blakely.
39

Practice Manual, Superior Court of the District of Columbia
Voluntary Sentencing Guidelines, ch. 5.
40

Blakely, slip op. at 13 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
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